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Chasing Reputation: The Argument
for Differential Treatment of "Public
Figures" in Canadian Defamation Law
BOB TARANTINO*
When comparing the seminal Supreme Court of Canada defamation decisions of the 1990s
and 2000s, it is apparent that the Court's view on the importance of protecting reputation
has changed. Recent decisions hail the importance of using freedom of expression as a
countervailing interest against the oft-criticized strictures of the common law of defamation.
Fundamental alterations in the nature of mass and interactive media and in the nature of
reputation are two phenomena informing this change. Increased attention to the theorizing
of "reputation, the interest whose protection animates the entire tort of defamation, reveals
that reputation is itself a highly constructed, contextual, and malleable artifact. This article
proposes recasting the tort of defamation into two different tracks: one for public figures, who
pose the highest risk of abusing the tort, and one for private plaintiffs, whose reputational
interest is akin to traditional notions of reputation.
Lorsque Ion compare les arritis annonciateurs en matiere de diffamation, que Ia Cour
Supreme du Canada a rendus dans Les annees 1990 et 2000, on voit U'volution du point de
vue de Ia Cour sur limportance de prot6ger Ia reputation. Les arr&tes r6cents saluent
L'importance de recourir a Ia libert6 d'expression en tant qu'int6rat compensateur des
retrecissements - souvent critiqu6s - que comporte Ia common lawen matibre de diffama-
tion. Des alterations fondamentales de La nature des mass-m6dias et des m6dias interactifs,
ainsi que de Ia nature mime de Ia r6putation, constituent deux ph~nomenes qui dessinent
ce changement. Une attention accrue sur [a th6orisation de La << r6putation, > interit dont
Ia protection meut Le dMtit entier de La diffamation, r6vele que Ia rdputation est en eLte-mime
une creation extrimement etabor6e, contextuelle et malleable. Cet article propose de
rediriger le delit de diffamation sur deux voies differentes : tune pour les personnalit6s
publiques, qui pr6sentent le plus grand risque d'abuser de ce delit; lautre pour Les
plaignants priv6s, dont Uint6rit pour leur rdputation est conforme aux notions traditionnelles
de Ia r6putation.
LL.B., LL.M. (Osgoode Hall), B.C.L. (Oxon.). Lawyer, Entertainment Law Group, Heenan
Blaikie LLP. An earlier version of this article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the Oxford B.C.L. degree. The author thanks Laura Hoyano for her prudent
advice and suggestions on that earlier version. Sole responsibility for any errors remains, of
course, with the author.
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IN THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS since the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)
described the protection of an individual's reputation as something that is "of
vital importance ... [and that] reflects the innate dignity of the individual, a
concept which underlies all the [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms']
rights," 2 Canadian courts, including the SCC itself, have dramatically shifted
the fulcrum of defamation law away from protecting reputation in favour of
freedom of expression. Whereas seminal SCC decisions on Canadian defamation
law from the 1990s, such as Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto' and R. v.
Lucas,4 expound in detail the doctrinal imperative of protecting an individual's
reputation, recent appellate decisions devote comparatively little attention to its
importance. Instead, these appellate decisions emphasize the need to modify
defamation law so as to accord a broader ambit to the rights of freedom of
expression and freedom of the media.
1. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c.1i [Charter].
2. Hill v. Church ofScientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 at paras. 117-20 [Hill].
3. Ibid.
4. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 [Lucas].
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This article explores the causes and implications of the decline of protecting
reputation as the focal point of Canadian defamation law. In short, the nature
of "reputation," and, hence, the nature of the interest that the tort of defamation
strives to protect, has changed in light of the development and spread of mass
and interactive communications technology. That nature has changed most
drastically for certain members of society who can be referred to as "public
figures." In light of that alteration of the underlying interest being protected, a
corresponding change in the mechanism that is used to protect it is needed. It
will be argued in this article that recent efforts at reforming defamation law
are too tentative to accomplish the goals that the reformers assert they wish to
achieve; if we are to take seriously the implications of the underlying motivations
for the doctrinal shifts we have seen, then a more radical restructuring of Cana-
dian defamation law is required.
A welcome development in some recent decisions is a movement away from
describing the task of the courts as balancing reputation and expression, in
preference to describing the undertaking as one of reconciling the competing
interestss-with reputation cast as the junior stakeholder. The privileging of
expression over reputation can be profitably described as a mechanism employed
by the courts to introduce a more nuanced understanding of reputation into
Canadian defamation law-both in terms of how it is socially constructed
and how the interest should be protected. While Canadian judges, like their
Commonwealth siblings, are unwilling to adopt a New York Times v. Sullivan'-
type approach to defamation law (which would require public figure plaintiffs to
prove actual malice in order to be successful at trial), doctrinal and technological
developments point in favour of an adapted cause of action for public figure
plaintiffs under Canadian law. To date, modifications made by Canadian courts
have been entirely in the area of defences (i.e., introducing a "responsible
communication on matters of public interest" defence' and expanding the
availability of the fair comment defencei). But if courts are serious about
circumscribing the chilling effect of defamation claims, modifications will need
to be made to the structure of the tort in order to lessen the likelihood of
5. WICRadio Ltd v. Simpson, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420 at para. 2 [WICRadio].
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [Sullivan].
7. Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 at para. 7 [Grant].
8. WIC Radio, supra note 5.
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actions being commenced in the first place and to blunt the impact of claims
that are in fact brought.
Expressly conceptualizing reputation within its proper context (i.e., recog-
nizing its contingent and constructed nature and taking account of the new
mechanisms available to individuals to affect that construction) should lead to
an adaptation of defamation law into two related but distinct causes of action:
one for individuals who lack the resources and wherewithal to actively construct
their reputation and one for public figure individuals who do possess those
advantages. Assuming the Charter represents a restatement of our fundamental
values, if courts meaningfully engage their responsibility to modify the common
law in accordance with dynamic social processes, and if the current state of the
media represents an elemental change in how information is disseminated, then
a reassessment of the nature of reputation and how it is protected is required.
In setting out the argument that substantiates the foregoing claims, Parts I
and II of this article delineate the current state of Canadian defamation law and
the status of reputation. The recent Cusson v. Quan,' Grant v. Torstar Corp.,'o and
WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson" decisions are compared to the Lucas and Hill deci-
sions of the previous decade, giving special attention to the factors that motivated
the greatly amplified weight recently accorded to freedom of expression. Part III
argues that the conventional metric of reputation is mistaken, or at least no longer
operative, and that Canadian courts are increasingly, if implicitly, acknowledging
and espousing a revised conceptualization of reputation. Finally, Part IV argues
that these developments require reconciliation to promote theoretical coherency
and practical efficiency, obliging the courts to express their (to date) implicit
acknowledgement of a proper understanding of the nature of reputation and the
mediating effect of modern communications media (particularly the internet and
the twenty-four hour news cycle). Doing so necessitates the development of a
dual-tracked defamation tort that allows public figure "reputation creators" to
"set the record straight," but to obtain recovery only where they can demonstrate
actual losses, while retaining the protections in place in the current law for non-
public figure individuals.
9. (2007), 87 O.R. (3d) 241 (C.A.) [Cusson (C.A.)]; Quan v. Cusson, (20091 3 S.C.R. 712
[Cusson].
10. Supra note 7.
11. Supra note 5.
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1. REPUTATION IN CANADIAN DEFAMATION LAW AFTER
HILL AND LUCAS
Two significant defamation decisions, Hill and Lucas, were released by the SCC
in the mid-1990s. Justice Cory wrote the majority reasons in both cases, and
though the former case involved a civil claim for defamation while the latter
involved a charge of criminal defamatory libel, two consistent themes are present:
the level of importance accorded to the protection of an individual's reputation
and the notion that Canadian courts had, at the time of the decisions, struck
the correct balance between the interests of reputation and freedom of expression.
The issue that occupies the bulk of the reasoning of the SCC in Hill is the
constitutionality of the common law action for defamation.12 The appellants
argued that
the common law of defamation has failed to keep step with the evolution of
Canadian society ... . The guiding principles on which defamation is based place
too much emphasis on the need to protect the reputation of plaintiffs at the
expense of the freedom of expression of defendants.' 3
They thus contended that the resulting situation was contrary to the
guarantee of freedom of expression in section 2(b) of the Charter." Because no
government action was implicated in this civil case, the SCC was not required
to engage in a formal R. v. Oakes" analysis (Oakes analysis); instead, it assessed
whether the common law of defamation comported with "the underlying values
12. The other major issue in the decision was the proper quantum of damages in a defamation
claim. In a moment of ill-advised theatricality, Morris Manning, a lawyer acting on behalf
of the Church of Scientology, had read out to reporters assembled on the courthouse steps
allegations contained in a notice of motion for criminal contempt proceedings that Manning
intended to file against Crown prosecutor Casey Hill. The contempt proceedings were
resolved in favour of Hill, with the allegations held to be untrue and without foundation.
Hill commenced a successful action for libel against both Manning and the Church of
Scientology, obtaining an award for defamation of the highest damages to date in
Canadian history.
13. Hill, supra note 2 at para. 63.
14. Supra note 1.
15. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. When a law infringes a Charter-guaranteed right, the Court determines
whether that law constitutes a justifiable limitation on the right pursuant to s. I of the
Charter. For an infringement to be justifiable, the objectives of the law must be pressing and
substantial, and the means used to achieve the objectives must be proportional.
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upon which the Charter is founded."' 6 In accordance with R. WD.S. U. v. Dolphin
Delivery Ltd." and R. v. Salituro, the SCC undertook a free-ranging and
contextual inquiry" that sought "to balance, in a broad and flexible manner,"
any conflict between the values that inform an existing common law rule or
doctrine and the values that inspired the provisions contained in the Charter.20
The Dolphin Delivery analysis permits courts to engage in a principle-driven
interrogation of the common law to ensure that it continues to "comply with
prevailing social conditions and values." 2' More importantly, adapting the
common law is an obligation, inherent in the role of the courts as "custodians
of the common law," whose duty it is to ensure that the common law "reflects
the emerging needs and values of our society."22 The extent of any such adapta-
tion is to be calibrated to the extent of changes in the societal context: while
recognizing that "[j]udges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the
changing social, moral and economic fabric of the country,"23 such adaptation
should be limited to "those incremental changes which are necessary to keep
the common law in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of our society."2"
The SCC framed its reasoning in Hill as a determination of whether the
common law of defamation had struck an appropriate balance between the
values of reputation and freedom of expression.25 In taking the opportunity to
write at length about the "importance of reputation," it identified reputation as
not only an important interest, but an interest having a value in democratic
16. Hill, supra note 2 at para. 82.
17. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 [Dolphin Delivery].
18. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 [Salituro].
19. See Hill, supra note 2 at para. 97. Here, the SCC described the analysis derived from Dolphin
Delivery as "more flexible" than a traditional Oakes analysis.
20. Ibid at para. 86. See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1, s. 52(1). The jurisdiction of the
courts to review the common law to ensure that it comports with the values underlying the
Charter is founded upon this section. It provides that "any law that is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."
21. Hill, ibid. at para. 91.
22. Ibid., citing Salituro, supra note 18 at 678.
23. Hill, ibid at para. 85, citing Salituro, ibid at 670.
24. Hill, ibid.
25. Ibid. at para. 100.
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societies co-extensive with that of freedom of expression. It is diffcult to
overstate the tenor of the SCC's language regarding reputation-reputation
was described as "closely related to the innate worthiness and dignity of the
individual."" The SCC posited that a good reputation underpins the funda-
mental political importance of the individual to democratic societies. 28 The
need to protect reputation was described as fundamental and vital not just to
the individual, but to democratic society as a whole.29 For all the rhetorical
flight, what actually constitutes a reputation was left unexamined, though
there are indications that the SCC conceived of reputation as an instrumental
good-it serves the "fundamentally important purpose of fostering our self-image
and sense of self-worth,"" and it is the "fundamental foundation on which
people are able to interact with each other in social environments."" The SCC
concluded that "the common law of defamation complies with the underlying
valiues of the Charter and there is no need to amend or alter it."3 2 justice Cory
opined that he
simply [could not] see that the law of defamation is unduly restrictive or inhibiting.
Surely it is not requiring too much of individuals that they ascertain the truth of the
allegations they publish. ... Those who publish statements should assume a reasonable
level of responsibility. 33
26. Ibid. at para. 107. The SCC went on to state that "[reputation] is an attribute that must, just
as much as freedom of expression, be protected by society's laws."
27. Ibid. See also at para. 117. Here, the SCC included a quotation from the United States
Supreme Court (US SC) decision in Rosenb/att v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 at 92 (1966). The SCC
quoted the US SC as stating that "the right of a man to the protection of his own reputation
... reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being."
28. Hill, ibid. at para. 108.
29. Ibid. at paras. 116-17. See also at para. 120. The SCC stated that "the good reputation of
the individual represents and reflects the innate dignity of the individual, a concept that
underlies all the Charter rights. It follows that the protection of the good reputation of an
individual is of fundamental importance to our democratic society."
30. Ibid at para. 117.
31. Ibid., citing David Lepofsky, "Making Sense of the Libel Chill Debate: Do Libel Laws 'Chill'
the Exercise of Freedom of Expression?" (1994) 4 N.J.C.L. 169 at 197.
32. Hill, ibid. at para. 141.
33. Ibid. at para. 137.
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The SCC did, however, qualify its statement by noting that the media were
not involved in the appeal and that its conclusion on the matter of the proper
balance was limited to the application of the common law to the parties in the
present action.34
Three years after the Hill decision, the SCC had an opportunity to pro-
nounce on defamation law in the context of a criminal charge of defamatory libel
in Lucas.3 ' The SCC undertook an Oakes analysis, conceding that the Criminal
Code provisions did prima facie infringe on freedom of expression. The SCC
reiterated its emphatic language from Hill regarding the fundamental importance
of protecting reputation3 1 and set out a vigorous defence of the need for both a
civil tort and a criminal offence as devices to further both the individual and state
interest in protecting reputation.3 1 In concluding that the Ciminal Code provision
was a demonstrably justifiable limit on freedom of expression, and thus constitu-
tional pursuant to the Oakes analysis, the SCC stated that
defamatory libel is far from and indeed inimical to the core values of freedom of
expression. It would trivialize and demean the magnificent panoply of rights guaran-
teed by the Charter if a significant value was attached to the deliberate recounting of
defamatory lies that are likely to expose a person to hatred, ridicule or contempt.
It is thus clear that defamatory libel is so far removed from the core values of freedom
of expression that it merits but scant protection.38
After Hill and Lucas, the following assertion seemed to be indisputable:
reputation is of critical importance, and while courts have both the power and
the obligation to modify the common law of defamation to comport with
changing social realities, in the eyes of the SCC in the mid- to late-1990s, the
balance between reputation and expression effected by defamation law required
no material change.39
34. Ibid at paras. 139-41. The SCC posed the question of whether the defence of qualified
privilege should be expanded to comply with Charter values and decided that only a marginal
modification to extend the privilege to documents that were about to be filed with the court
was necessary.
35. Lucas, supra note 4. See also Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 298-301.
36. Lucas, ibid. at para. 49.
37. Ibid at para. 73ff. The Court read into the Criminal Code a requirement of intention to defame.
38. Ibid. at paras. 93-94.
39. Hill, supra note 2 at para. 141; Lucas, ibid. at para. 109.
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II. REPUTATION IN CANADIAN DEFAMATION LAW AFTER
WIC RADIO, CUSSON, AN D GRANT
Within a dozen years of the decision in Lucas, the SCC delivered three further
decisions that contain significant changes in rhetorical tone and substantive
content with respect to the tort of defamation. What is most striking when
reading the WIC Radio, Cusson, and Grant decisions is the change in tenor.
Where prev'iously the tort of defamation stood like a citadel surrounding it,
reputation has now become the subject of criticism for the courts as the per-
ceived need to foster free expression has moved to the fore. This Part offers an
overview of the three decisions and attempts to synthesize the relevant changes
and their importance.
A. WIC RADIO
In a forceful set of arguments in WIC Radio," the SCC held that defamation
law had proven inimical to the exercise of the rights of freedom of expression
and freedom of the press. The SCC expressed particular concern about the
"chilling" effect that defamation law exerts on matters of public interest:
The traditional elements of that tort of defamation may require modification to pro-
vide broader accommodation to the value of freedom of expression. There is concern
that matters of public interest go unreported because publishers fear the ballooning
cost and disruption of defending a defamation action ... . Public controversy can
be a rough trade, and the law needs to accommodate its requirements. 4
As with Cusson and Grant, what is striking about WIC Radio is the drastic
change in the language used to discuss defamation law. Abjuring detailed
discussion about reputation, expression is acknowledged as the "very life blood
of our freedom and free institutions."" WIG Radio is similar to Hill in that it
involved private litigants, and so the Charter did not directly govern. Unlike
Hill, however, the case involved a media defendant, and the SCC elected to
40. Supra note 5. Rafe Mair, a radio "shock jock," during an on-air editorial about conservative
social activist Kari Simpson, drew analogies between Simpson's public statements and the
actions and activities of Adolf Hitler, skinheads, and the Ku Klux Klan. The SCC affirmed
the trial judge's decision to dismiss Simpson's claim for libel.
41. Ibid. at para. 15.
42. Ibid. at para. 1.
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exercise its inherent jurisdiction to modify the common law to accord with
current social realities and Charter values. To effect this change, the "honest
belief' element of the fair comment defence was modified to delete any reference
to "fair-mindedness" and to require only that any person could honestly express
the opinion on the basis of the proved facts (i.e., an "objective" honest belief
test), as distinct from requiring that the defendant subjectively believed the
expressed opinion." The SCC emphasized the "broad latitude" to be accorded
to the defence, particularly where matters of public controversy were at play."
Of particular interest are three aspects of the SCC's reasoning: first, the
recognition that defamation law requires a re-calibration to match current
social realities; second, the articulation of what those social realities actually
are, particularly as they relate to modern communications media; and third,
the recognition that certain defamation plaintiffs can and should be treated in
different ways. The SCC also subtly, but importantly, modified the description
of its task. Unlike at the time of Hill, it is now engaged not in a balancing of
competing interests, but in a "reconciliation" of those interests." Whereas
"balancing" implies that some kind of external instrument is required to offset
incommensurate weights (and thus the use of a device-such as the fair comment
defence-as a fulcrum between reputation and expression), "reconciliation"
implies a reduction of competing forces to states where they are consistent with
one another. While balance requires the use of exogenous tools, reconciliation
strives to make constituent parts congruent without the need for external devices.
The three aspects of the WIC Radio reasoning identified above merge in
their articulation by the SCC. The traditional balancing act in defamation law
is altered in light of the identity (or capacities) of the plaintiff. In several places,
the SCC seems to perceive that there would be something inequitable (in a
non-technical sense) about allowing the plaintiff to resort to a defamation claim
in light of her own actions: "[T]he Court of Appeal unduly favoured protection
of Kari Simpson's reputation in a rancourous public debate in which she had
involved herself as a major protagonist."" Simpson's "very public actions and
words," which included making public speeches over a long period of time,
43. Ibid. at paras. 45-51.
44. Ibid. at para. 62.
45. Ibid at para. 2. Justice Binnie explained that "[tihe Court's task is not to prefer one over the
other by ordering a 'hierarchy' of rights, but to attempt a reconciliation" [citation omitted].
46. Ibid. at para. 4 [emphasis added].
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were what had "earned" Simpson her- reputation." She had, in an important
sense, been an active participant in the public construction of her reputation.
The interplay between Mair's words and Simpson's reputation is also the subject
of attention: "Mair has a reputation for provoking controversy. ... His listeners
expect to hear extravagant opinions and ... discount them accordingly.""
In canvassing the social circumstances in which Mair and Simpson were
embedded, the SCC acknowledges that there is an element of theatricality to
current public debate:
In much modern media, personalities such as Rafe Mair are as much entertainers as
journalists. The media regularly match up assailants who attack each other on a set
topic. The audience understands that the combatants, like lawyers or a devil's advo-
cate, are arguing a brief. What is important in such a debate on matters of public
interest is that all sides of an issue are forcefully presented ... .
The notable element of the foregoing passage is the SCC's recognition that
the parties are involved in a somewhat artificial endeavour; the notion of a dispas-
sionate public measurement of truth values and reputations is belied. Multiple
levels of dialogic activity occur, both between combatants and between the com-
batants and their audience. The audience is acknowledged as savvy about what is
being presented to it. The public understands well, for example, the function of
satirists who are called upon to blow into "outlandish caricature" public views
and public figures. 0 The public is also viewed as engaged enough to know when
to discount the "sting" of a statement, depending on its source and context.
The concurring judgment of Justice LeBel is also notable for the robust
manner in which it engages the experience of modern media. Justice LeBel parts
from the majority reasoning with respect to the issue of whether Mair's comments
were prima facie defamatory. He contests the conclusion by encouraging a highly
context-dependent analysis when assessing whether a statement is defamatory,
stating that "[r]elevant factors to be considered ... include: ... how much is pub-
licly known about the plaintiff; the nature of the audience; and the context of the
47. Ibid at para. 7.
48. Ibid at para. 5.
49. Ibid. at para. 47.
50. Ibid. at para. 48.
51. Ibid
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comment."5 2 According to Justice LeBel's account, our relationship with mass
and interactive media is an experiential one. He describes "an age when the public
is exposed to an astounding quantity and variety of commentaries on issues of
public interest, ranging from political debate in the House of Commons ... to a
high school student's blog."" That volume of information prompts a filtering
response from audience members. The audience does not take statements at face
value, but evaluates them based on variables such as the audience member's own
knowledge and opinions about the speaker and the subject." Crucially, Justice
LeBel's account also recognizes that the class of defamation plaintiffs is made up
of different types of actors whose relationships to their own reputations differ:
[Alithough public figures are certainly more open to criticism than those who avoid
the public eye, this does not mean that their reputations are necessarily more vul-
nerable. In fact, public figures may have greater opportunity to influence their own
reputations for the better.55
Justice LeBel's reasons also properly draw attention to this nuance:
This is not to say that harm to one's reputation is the necessary price of being a public
figure. Rather it means that what may harm a private individual's reputation may not
damage that of a figure about whom more is known and who may have had ample
opportunity to express his or her own contrary views.s5
That understanding of how the media impact defamation cases leads to an
articulation of differential treatment. The notion that the public figure occupies a
different position with respect to the tort itself and the interests that the tort is
intended to serve is also embodied in the earlier jurisprudence. In its reasoning,
the WIC Radio majority approvingly cited words written more than a century
earlier by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Macdonell v. Robinson: "Whoever
seeks notoriety, or invites public attention, is said to challenge public criticism;
and he cannot resort to the law courts, if that criticism be less favourable than
52. Ibid. at para. 69.
53. Ibid. at para. 73.
54. Ibid
55. Ibid. at para. 74.
56. Ibid at para. 75.
57. (1885), 12 O.A.R. 270 at 272 [Macdonel].
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he anticipated."" Justice LeBel expanded on this point, noting that entering the
public arena entailed not just a detached understanding that response would
occur, but an actual invitation of response: "[P]ublic response will often be one
of the goals of self-expression.""
B. CUSSONAND GRANT
The procedural histories of the Cusson and Grant cases are intertwined and
so require some explanation. In November 2007, the Court of Appeal for
Ontario rendered its decision in Cusson, wherein it accepted the arguments
of the defendants and a number of media interveners and concluded that in
order to properly reorient defamation law to accord with a new social reality,
a new "public interest responsible journalism" (PIRJ) defence should be
recognized as a component of Canadian defamation law."0 In crafting the
new defence, the Court of Appeal for Ontario took inspiration in large part
from the English House of Lords decisions of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers
Ltd." and Jameel (Mohammed) v. Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl,62 which
had developed a largely similar defence (often referred to as the "Reynolds
privilege") over the last decade. However, because the Cusson defendants had
not relied on the defence in trial pleadings, the Court of Appeal for Ontario
held that they were not entitled to benefit from it and, accordingly, dis-
missed the appeal. One year later, in 2008, the Court of Appeal for Ontario
rendered its decision in Grant v. Torstar Corp,63 wherein it reiterated that the
PIRJ defence is part of Canadian defamation law and ordered a new trial on
the basis that the trial judge had improperly charged the jury and had improp-
erly usurped the role of the jury in deciding on the meaning of the impugned
statements. Thus, at the appellate level, Cusson was the substantively more
important decision, while Grant was concerned more with the minutiae of
procedure; both cases were appealed to the SCC, where their relative signifi-
cance was reversed.
58. WIC Radio, supra note 5 at para. 57, citing Macdonell, ibid.
59. WIC Radio, ibid. at para. 75.
60. Supra note 9.
61. [2001] 2 A.C. 127 [Reynolds].
62. [2007] 1 A.C. 359 [ameelJ.
63. (2008), 92 O.R. (3d) 195 (C.A.).
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The SCC issued its decisions in Grant and Cusson on the same day, describing
them as "companion" decisions." Its decision in Grant became a landmark in
Canadian defamation law, expanding upon the beachhead created by the Court
of Appeal for Ontario in Cusson and confirming the existence of a new defence
called, in its Canadian iteration, "responsible communication on matters of
public interest" (RCPI)." The RCPI defence is broader than the PIRJ defence
created by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in a variety of ways, including
the fact that it is not limited to media defendants but can be pleaded by any
defendant." In contrast to its earlier prominence, the Cusson decision, in which
a new trial was ordered so that the media defendants could make use of the
RCPI defence, was reduced to a less important role.
While a comprehensive treatment of the RCPI defence is beyond the scope
of this article, attention should be paid to the attitude toward reputation that
the introduction of RCPI demonstrates. As the SCC phrased it, the issue in
Grant and Cusson was "whether the defences to actions for defamatory statements
of fact should be expanded, as has been done for statements of opinion [i.e., in
WIC Radio], in recognition of the importance of freedom of expression in a free
society."6 ' Answering in the affirmative, the SCC created a broadly applicable
new defence," which is available to any defendant who can demonstrate that
the published statements were on a matter of public interest and that the
"publication was responsible, in that he or she was diligent in trying to verify
the allegation(s), having regard to all the relevant circumstances. "69 Drawing
on Reynolds, it identified a series of factors (described as "non-exhaustive but
illustrative") to be used in assessing whether a publication was "responsible,"
including the seriousness of the allegation, the status and reliability of the
source, and the presence or absence of steps taken to obtain the plaintiff's
response." A major distinction between RCPI and its Reynolds/Jameel antecedents
is that RCPI is not a species of qualified privilege, but is rather a new defence
64. Cusson, supra note 9 at para. 1.
65. Grant, supra note 7 at para. 97.
66. Ibid. at para. 62.
67. Ibid. at para. 32.
68. Ibid at para. 95.
69. Ibid. at para. 98.
70. Ibid. at paras. 122, 126.
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that, to echo the words of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, is a "sensible half-way
house" between "traditional common law no-fault liability" and "the traditional
qualified privilege requirement for proof of malice.""
Consistent with other defamation decisions, neither Cusson nor Grant
expressly engages reputation as a discrete concept. However, the SCC does
take pains to articulate that an imbalance of some, kind has developed in
defamation lav. The march toward the adoption of the new defence began
with the Court of Appeal for Ontario noting that the traditional formulation
of defamation law "clearly favours the protection of reputation over freedom
of expression.""2 The court in Cusson paid particular attention to the develop-
ment of the "Reynolds privilege" in England and observed that foreign courts
have all concluded that the traditional common law standard unduly burdens free-
dom of expression and have all made appropriate modifications to achieve a more
appropriate balance between protecting reputation on the one hand and the public's
right to know on the other.7 3
The SCC in Grant stated that it is "simply beyond debate that the limited
defences available to press-related defendants may have the effect of inhibiting
political discourse and debate on matters of public importance, and impeding
the cut and thrust of discussion necessary to discovery of the truth."" Taking
particular note of juridical developments in other common law jurisdictions, 5
the SCC took guidance from the fact that courts in many jurisdictions had
modified their common law of defamation to "give more weight to the value of
freedom of expression and robust public debate.""
Of particular interest is the new focus of concern for the courts when applying
the new defence. The Court of Appeal for Ontario in Cusson approvingly cited
Reynolds and Jameel in stating that courts "should be slow to conclude that a
publication was not in the public interest," that "[a]ny lingering doubts should be
resolved in favour of publication," and that the new defence is "to be applied
71. Cusson (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 139.
72. Ibid. at para. 37.
73. Ibid. at para. 122.
74. Supra note 7 at para. 57.
75. See generally infra note 139.
76. Grant, supra note 7 at para. 66ff.
77. Suipra note 9 at paras. 90, 97.
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in a media-friendly manner."" In speaking about RCPI, the SCC similarly
made reference to Jameel and Reynolds and held that, in order to "foster free
expression and a free press, ... a degree of deference should be shown to the
editorial judgment of the players, particularly professional editors and journal-
ists."" As expressly recognized by the courts, the importation of a PIRJ/RCPI
defence alters the calculus of defamation law away from protecting an individual's
reputation, in favour of unfettered speech by the media."o
Informing the decisions in Cusson and Grant is the view that the balance
effected by the traditional common law regime no longer obtains. Whereas pre-
viously, society had made a "clear choice to forego a certain level of exposure,
scrutiny and criticism on matters of public interest in the name of protecting
individual reputation,""' in light of the enactment of the Charter, the degree to
which defamation law previously impinged on freedom of expression could no
longer be tolerated.82 According to the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Cusson,
"the inhibiting effect of traditional defamation law is incompatible with the
climate of free and robust debate to which a democratic society aspires."83 Similarly,
the SCC in Grant was forced to "conclude that the current law ... does not give
adequate weight to the constitutional value of free expression. While the law
must protect reputation, the level of protection currently accorded by the law ...
is not justifiable."" Left unsaid in the decisions is why this conclusion is so
different from that reached by the SCC in Hill less than fifteen years earlier.
While it is clear that the courts felt that the common law needed to be supple-
mented by PIRJ/RCPI.in order to keep it "in step with the dynamic and evolving
78. Ibid. at para. 97.
79. Grant, supra note 7 at para. 73.
80. Cusson (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 142. See also Grant, ibid. at para. 61.
81. Cusson, supra note 9 at para. 129.
82. See Grant, supra note 7 at para. 53. The SCC states that
txisting common law rules mean, in effect, that the publisher must be certain before publication
that it can prove the statement to be true in a court of law, should a suit be filed. Verification
of the facts and reliability of the sources may lead a publisher to a reasonable certainty of
their truth, but that is different from knowing that one will be able to prove their truth
in a court of law, perhaps years later. This, in turn, may have a chilling effect on what is
published. Information that is reliable and in the public's interest to know may never see
the light of day.
83. Supra note 9 at para. 129.
84. Supra note 7 at para. 65.
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fabric of our society"" and to "give appropriate weight to the public interest in
the free flow of information, "86 it is unclear why this had become such a pressing
imperative since the previous decade, though brief mention was made of the new
social reality to which defamation law needed to respond and which consisted of,
inter alia, "the modern development of mass communications.""
The cumulative result of the Cusson, Grant, and WIC Radio decisions is a
devaluation of the currency of "reputation," certainly as compared to earlier
decisions such as Hill and Lucas. This leaves one questioning what prompted
the change. I submit that it is not that society now prizes free expression more
than it once did, but that there is an increasing recognition that reputation is
being reconstructed and reconfigured-in short, that the law of defamation is
no longer the sole, or perhaps even the best, mechanism for protecting reputation,
and so this law is in need of modification. To substantiate that claim, attention
must be turned to the nature of reputation.
III. THE CONCEPT OF REPUTATION
Raymond Brown may only slightly exaggerate when he says, "Hardly anything
good has been said about the law of defamation."" One US commentator opines
that the tort "operates erratically at best, and perversely at worst," complaining
that plaintiffs are unable to "clear their names," defendants are held liable for
"unpredictable damages," and the public is deprived of information." As outlined
above, Canadian appellate courts are in the midst of a period of doctrinal revision
stemming from a similar sense of disquiet with the tort. The factors giving rise
to the general sense of dissatisfaction among litigants and commentators are
the same that have prompted the decisive change in the courts' stance on the
appropriate balance in the law.. Hill offers a hint as to what those factors are
when referring to the fact that current defamation law is "essentially the product
85. Cusson (C.A.), supra note 9 at para. 139, citing Salituro, supra note 18 at 670.
86. Cusson (C.A.), ibid. at para. 133.
87. Ibid. at para. 105, citing Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997), 145 A.L.R. 96
at 110-11 (H.C.) [Lange].
88. Raymond Brown, The Law ofDefamation in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 4.
89. Marc Franklin, "Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal" (1983)
18 U.S.F. L. Rev. I at 2 [Franklin, "Good Names"].
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of its historical development up to the seventeenth century."o The doctrine of the
tort is nearly three centuries out of date and does not accord with contemporary
conceptions of what an appropriate tort of defamation should look like."
However, even that conclusion remains unnecessarily vague; what precisely
about the tort has failed to keep pace with current sensibilities? The lagging
indicator is the concept of reputation and the latent recognition that the strictures
of the tort do not harmonize with a modern understanding of what reputation
is and how it is created, sustained, and modified.92 Commentators and courts
are dissatisfied because defamation law has failed to keep pace with a more
sophisticated understanding of reputation and the impact of mass media and
interactive technologies, which makes the construction and repair of a reputation
markedly different from what it once was and was understood to be.
To appreciate the disjunction that has arisen in the tort of defamation, the
tort's theoretical contours must be outlined. A basic formulation of the tort of
defamation is that a person may have a claim for damages where a third party
has uttered or written a statement that is "defamatory." In order to qualify as
defamatory, the statement must "injure the reputation" of the plaintiff, and
such injury is manifested by a lowering of the plaintiff "in the estimation of
right-thinking members of.society generally and in particular to cause him to be
regarded with feelings of hatred, contempt, ridicule, fear, dislike, or disesteem.""
In short, the reputation of an individual is what is protected by the tort"-
however, as noted by the SCC in Hill, very little has been written by the courts
about that central concept and its constitutive elements. Numerous commenta-
tors, writing in both English and US contexts, have noted that the common law
has shied away from attempting to define reputation." Some have concluded
90. Supra note 2 at para. 116.
91. See generally Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007) at 35. McNamara explores the disjunction that has arisen between defamation
law conceptions of "defamatory" that are precedent-driven and modern liberal democratic
conceptions of what the purpose of the tort should be.
92. See David Rolph, Reputation, Celebrity and Defamation Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) at
186. See also McNamara, ibid.
93. Vander Zalm v. Times Publishers (1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 531 at 535 (B.C. C.A.); WIC Radio,
supra note 5 at para. 67. See also Sim v. Stretch, [19361 2 All E.R. 1237 at 1241 (H.L. (Eng.)).
94. Rolph, supra note 92 at 1.
95. See Robert C. Post, "The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution" (1986) 74 Cal. L. Rev. 691. See also "Developments in the Law: Defamation"
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that, as a jurisprudential matter, the courts have failed to locate reputation" and
that, as a practical matter, it is not necessary to do so." Others have argued that a
proper assessment of the tort necessarily requires that its foundational elements be
cogently articulated." The latter view is preferable. To assess whether the tort as it
is currently constructed is properly performing its instrumental role requires an
understanding of what reputation is-we need to know what is being protected
in order to ask whether it is being protected well. A purposive approach to the
law begins with the supposition that the law is a mechanism for accomplishing
some objective. Identifying that objective is, therefore, critical.
Robert Post's seminal article on reputation analysis posits three different
concepts of reputation that "the common law of defamation has at various
times in its history attempted to protect": reputation as honour, property, and
dignity." As conceded by Post, property, dignity, and honour do not comprise
or exhaust the meaning of reputation, but they do inform its content. Post's
key insight is that reputation is a function of social interaction that "inheres
in the social apprehension that we have of each other.""'0 The apprehension is
itself a "social judgment of the person based upon facts considered relevant by
a community.".o. Reputation as honour, being rooted in the regard that is
accorded to certain roles, occupations, or social strata, has largely declined as an
operative concept, though it can assist in explaining certain quirks in the tort as
presently constituted.102 The remaining two concepts offer powerful accounts of
the interest that defamation aims to protect.
Post argues that reputation as property (which conceptualizes the interest as a
"form of intangible property akin to goodwill") is still an animating framework
for modern defamation law, one which provides "an internally coherent account"
(1956) 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875 at 877; Eric Barendt, "What is the Point of Libel Law?" (1999)
52 Curr. Legal Probs. 110; and Jill Cottrell, "What Does 'Defamatory' Mean? Reflections on
Berkoffv Burchill" (1998) 6 Tort L. Rev. 149 at 150-51.
96. See e.g. Cottrell, ibid. at 150. Cottrell notes that "the truth is that English law has not
decided what the law of defamation protects and why."
97. Ibid. at 160.
98. McNamara, supra note 91.
99. Supra note 95 at 693.
100. Ibid. at 692.
101. McNamara, supra note 91 at 21.
102. Post, supra note 95 at 707.
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of many aspects of defamation law,'" though it does not do so comprehensively.
One salient facet of reputation as property is that reputation is an asset that can
be "earned," or at least is the "result of an individual's efforts and labour";'10
improperly impugning reputation then is to "unjustly destroy" the fruits of that
work.' This concept presupposes that reputation is something that is created-
i.e., it is constituted, rather than bestowed.'
Describing reputation as "dignity" will be familiar to any reader of Hill and
Lucas. The precise relationship between reputation and dignity is found in the
constitutive aspect of identity: the identity of the self is created by the internaliza-
tion of the perspectives of others in the community-an individual's identity is
"continuously being constituted through social interactions.""0 ' The creation and
maintenance of a public image is an assertion of autonomy, an extension of
Ronald Dworkin's view of autonomy as the self-construction of identity.' Thus,
similar to the property account, dignity views reputation as constructed through
time and not as static and dependent on role fulfilment. Dignity itself consists of
the deference and demeanour properly owed to an individual by other members
of the community, and the content and form of such owed deference and
demeanour is communicated to other members of the community by means of
an individual's reputation. Dignity is a vector of "the aspects of personal identity
that stem from membership in the general community."10'
103. Ibid at 693, 696.
104. Ibid. at 693.
105. Ibid at 694.
106. Ibid. at 695.
107. Ibid at 708-09.
108. Thomas Gibbons, "Defamation Reconsidered" (1996) 16 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 587; Ronald
Dworkin, Life's Dominion (London: Harper Collins, 1993) at 224. A related notion was
advanced in Hill, which states that the law of defamation "is the means by which the
individual may protect his or her reputation which may well be the most distinguishing
feature of his or her character, personality and, perhaps, identity." See Hill, supra note 2 at
para. 137.
109. Post, supra note 95 at 715. Post's notion of reputation as dignity appears to rest on the notion
that each individual is entitled to participate in society in accordance with the terms prescribed
by the "reciprocal observance of rules of civility"-in short, so long as you act in accordance
with certain parameters of conduct, you should be entitled to be admitted to the
membership of the community and treated in a particular matter (at 716).
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Because "the esteem in which we are held by others is an integral aspect
of our own dignity and self-esteem,".o the tort of defamation seeks to protect
against unjustified diminutions of one's reputation that can lead to a disjunction
between the dignity to which one is entitled and the signals that the community
has received; it is that potential disjunction with which the tort is concerned."'
Post describes the successful defamation plaintiff as having engaged in a trial
that results in a "rehabilitation" of reputation-the court's verdict confirms the
plaintiff as worthy of respect." 2 For Post, truth is an essential concern of the
defamation trial, as it is the binary mechanism by which the court definitively
pronounces on the plaintiff being entitled to either esteem.or stigma. Having
stated the goal in such terms, the question can be formulated of whether the
tort does an adequate job of fixing the chasm that might open between dignity
(understood as appropriate social response) and mistaken information that has
been publicly circulated. In order to answer that, the question of how reputation
is created must be engaged. Since reputation arises from social interaction, the
methods and modes of that social interaction impact how reputation is created
and modified.
Post's observation that reputation derives from mutual social apprehension is
echoed in Jerome H. Skolnick's assertion that defamation is "a distinctively socio-
logical tort""' and Robert N. Bellah's claim that reputation is not a possession,
but a "relation between persons.""' In modern liberal democracies, that relation
between persons is mediated to a significant extent by communications tech-
nologies."' This notion is further developed by Thomas Gibbons, who provides a
perceptive account of reputation in the modern context."' The crux of his cri-
tique is that defamation law fails to "recognize the media's part in creating public
110. Barendt, supra note 95 at 116.
111. See Post, supra note 95 at 712. Post notes that defamation law "provides an occasion for a
court to resolve the ambiguity created when rules of civility [Post's term for rules of deference
and demeanour] are violated." See also at 713. Here, Post describes a dual function for the
tort: the individualist-oriented protection of dignity, coupled with a publicly-oriented
policing of the "rules of civility."
112. Ibid. at 713.
113. "Foreword: The Sociological Tort of Defamation" (1986) 74 Cal. L. Rev. 677 at 677.
114. "The Meaning of Reputation in American Society" (1986) 74 Cal. L. Rev. 743 at 743.
115. For an early apprehension of the impact of this, see ibid. at 7 4 7.
116. Supra note 108.
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images" and the role that mediated images play in the "social relationships of
real people."'.. As per Gibbons, reputation is a process of evaluation and func-
tions in a manner consonant with that postulated by Post-each individual
engages in the presentation of "a self for public constfmption," which is (infor-
mally) evaluated by means of seeking evidence (i.e., information or statements)
to bolster or discredit the presented self."' Gibbons thus provides a mechanism
for understanding how social relationships create reputation, a process that
individuals can influence and even direct. The presentation process itself occu-
pies different points along a spectrum: from the do-it-yourself style adopted by
Kari Simpson, whereby an individual engages in grassroots public participation,
to the engagement of a battery of public relations professionals."' There is,
therefore, a category of individuals who have the ability and desire not only to
"promote their personal images through the media," but who can "move to cor-
rect any inaccuracies which arise."120 Because there is.a constant presentation of
new reputation-affecting information, a reputation is contingent and subject to
reappraisal-but the law as it stands is reluctant to recognize this dynamic.
That dynamic also has its own tempo, which appears to have increased in the
modern era:
Many of our ideas about reputation are products of a simpler era. ... In today's plural-
istic society, much is tolerated and little is universally condemned. A congressman can
be the subject of a sex scandal one year and win an election the next. An entertainer
can pursue drug abuse to the brink of death and return more popular than ever.
Behaviour that outrages adults can make a musician the idol of millions of teenagers.
Even if one's reputation is harmed, the victim is not condemned automatically to
live out his life in disgrace. The mobility and anonymity of modern society make
rehabilitation [of reputation] much easier.121
117. Ibid. at 587.
118. Ibid. at 591.
119. See e.g. Rolph, supra note 92 at 175, citing Chris Rojeck, Celebrity (London: Reaktion
Books, 2001) at 10-11. Rolph describes this as the "institutionalised machinery of
celebrity." This involves the corps of "agents, publicists, marketing personnel,
promoters, photographers, fitness trainers, wardrobe staff, cosmetics experts and
personal assistants."
120. Gibbons, supra note 108 at 611.
121. David A. Anderson, "Reputation, Compensation, and Proof" (1983-1984) 25 Win. & Mary
L. Rev. 747 at 777-78.
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The cycle of modern mass and interactive media has implications for reputa-
tions and the tort intended to protect them. The SCC's reasoning in WC Radio
is perhaps the first glimmer of an emerging acknowledgement that it is "vital to
engage with the media's role in creating and damaging reputations.""' 2 The
impact of mass and interactive media, with their attendant capability of enabling
the construction and ongoing modification of a worldwide profile, is significant
enough for David Rolph to argue that a new concept of reputation-reputation
as "celebrity"-has arisen to supplement Post's framework.' Celebrity is not a
separate concept of reputation, but is better conceived of as a new instantiation
of reputation-it is a different manner in which reputations can be constructed.
It provides an explanatory device for illustrating why Kari Simpson's reputation
was the hinge on which a more robust fair comment defence turned-because
her reputation was of a different type from others and therefore warranted
different treatment."' The constituent element of Simpson's "different type" of
reputation is that it is constructed and maintained largely through the device of
mass and interactive media.'25 Unlike the traditional conception of reputation
as property, which was formulated in a pre-media age and which relies largely
on personal interactions, this form of reputation relies on impersonal interactions.
Unlike reputation as dignity, which inheres in the individual qua individual
and which can be understood as the core concept of reputation, reputation as
celebrity is an additional construct that is layered on top of the subsidiary
concepts of dignity and property.126
Reputation as celebrity is almost entirely a modern phenomenon,
emerging in the twentieth century with the pervasive penetration of the
122. Rolph, supra note 92 at 37.
123. Ibid.
124. See also ibid. at 138ff, 162ff. Here, Rolph tracks similar treatment in Australian cases. This
also helps to explain why the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Cusson, while eager to employ
PIRJ, was unwilling to grant judgment in favour of the defendants-Cusson was a private
individual who was thrust into the public spotlight. See Cusson (C.A.), supra note 9.
125. See Rolph, ibid. at 172.
126. Thus, every individual has a dignity-based reputation that arises from his or her status as a
person. In addition to that, he or she may have a reputation derived from personal
interactions with others, such as family, friends, and close associates. Finally, certain
individuals will have a media-constructed reputation, which supersedes the others for
purposes of defamation law.
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internet providing a further catalyst. 127 It is only with the proliferation of
mass communications media (newspapers, periodicals, radio, and television),
compounded with interactive media (the internet and its features, such as
email, personalized websites, Facebook, et cetera), that one's ability to construct,
maintain, modify, and repair one's reputation has taken on a power that
outstrips defamation law. The key criterion of celebrity reputation is that its
possessor has discursive power "to generate, shape and participate in public
discourses" beyond that of the regular individual.12 ' A banal but telling example
is that of the public figure, who can secure a media interview in order to
rebut a contested allegation. The effect of celebrity reputation is practical:
why should the blunt instrument of the traditional defamation tort be used to
reify a reputation if the individual in question has the ability to protect his or
her reputation far more quickly and effectively? The importance of protecting
a reputation is ameliorated by and to the extent of the individual's ability to
self-help. With respect to reputation creators, the public interest in ensuring
the accuracy of information in the public sphere stands as the primary remaining
rationale for judicial involvement. Just as there is a societal interest in protect-
ing reputations, there is a societal interest in ensuring that the public record
is accurate. The correction of defamatory lies, in addition to ameliorating
the damage done to a reputation, is also about ensuring access to accurate
information for decision making.' The extensive reach of modern media
means there is an even greater impetus for the courts to participate in truth
determination, as a function of the societal interest in "reducing-efforts to
distort communication."'" In line with Post's conception of reputation as a
community-oriented instrument for ensuring appropriate social responses,
there is also a "community interest in knowing the truth of a defamatory
charge."'' But the nature of the court's ongoing role in truth determination
need not remain static; the historic form of the tort of defamation is not the
only possible or desirable one.
127. Rolph, supra note 92 at 173.
128. Ibid. at 175.
129. See Hill, supra note 2 at para. I17;-Grant, supra note 7 at para. 65.
130. Gibbons, supra note 108 at 591.
131. Skolnick, supra note 113 at 686.
TARANTINO, CHASING REPUTATION 619
As reputation is an appraisal based on facts as measured against social
values,'32 it becomes critical to ensure the accuracy of the flow of information.
The impact of mass and interactive media is not unidirectional; it enables both
the creation and subsequent challenge of public images."' Paradoxically, though
aiming at ensuring the accuracy of information, if defamation law is applied in
too restrictive a manner, it risks interrupting the flow of information; it may
impede the willingness of individuals or media outlets to publish statements
that may be viewed as defamatory, even if they are true. As it stands, current
defamation law can be explained as being empirically concerned with ensuring
the reliability of the "factual elements of constructing a reputation."1 1 This
needs to be expressly articulated and advanced as a purposive criterion for the
doctrine, subject to the demonstrated ability of an individual to construct his or
her own reputation.
The nature of the internet and the communications it facilitates has altered
the way in which readers interact with information.' The interconnectivity and
malleable nature of the information presented on the internet have implications
for defamation law in particular. Whereas previously a defamatory statement
published in the print edition of a newspaper was inviolate in that iteration (i.e.,
someone looking at the original publication in an archive might not know that
the statement was later retracted or corrected unless they also saw the subsequent
edition containing such retraction or correction), the ability of editors to
132. Gibbons, supra note 108 at 592.
133. Ibid. at 591.
134. Ibid. at 597.
135. See Kim von Arx, "LitOral: A New Form of Defamation Consciousness" (2002) 1 C.J.L.T.
63. Drawing on the work of Walter Ong, who argued that this transformative process
began with media such as radio and television, von Arx argues that we are in the midst of a
"secondary orality" (at 63). Underlying von Arx's analysis is a recognition that, at least in the
online context, the protocols of communication have been altered. The fragmented, dynamic,
and multi-noded nature of the internet means that readers are often engaged in a more
interrogative relationship vis-a-vis online information-the validity of sources needs to be
considered and the value of information discounted (or amplified) accordingly. The context
of information presentation gives rise to a separate interrogatory function that questions the
information itself, its source, and its mode of presentation. For example, information sent by
means of Twitter.com may be discounted as to its veracity as compared to information
disseminated by the website of a major metropolitan newspaper.
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permanently correct statements (in digital archives) or otherwise provide an
update about them (e.g., by means of hyperlinks to a correction or apology)
means that the very nature of the original defamatory statement can be ameliorated.
The contingent nature of a reputation, particularly that of the public figure,
has legal consequences, something that has long been recognized by Canadian
courts, and that has now been reaffirmed by the SCC in WIC Radio. Entering
into the public arena (which includes, at a minimum, deliberately using the
media in an effort to construct a reputation or advance a certain agenda) results
in a higher threshold for defamation, a legal thickening of the skin."' The current
shortcoming is that the law nominally accords the same level of protection to
all individuals, notwithstanding that some "have the capacity and resources to
mould their personal images to their own advantage,""' while others do not.
This is regrettable because the tort is being used to protect two very different
types of interest: the reputation interest of public figures and the reputation
interest of non-public figures. The tensions within and criticisms of the tort
arise from the fact that, although it is a device meant to protect a more fragile
interest (the reputation of a non-public figure), it is used to protect a more
robust interest (the reputation of a public figure). But instead of identifying
and expressly engaging in the underlying cause of the tensions and criticisms of
the tort, the courts appear content to simply make use of devices such as the
defences of fair comment and RCPI.
Until the development of the modern news and interactive infrastructure,
with its virtually endless volume of content being broadcast and made constantly
accessible, the tensions between defamation law and our social reality may have
been sustainable-but they are becoming disconnected, and this is having an
impact on freedom of expression. I submit it is this decoupling between defama-
tion law and social reality that informs the decisions in Grant, Cusson, and WIC
Radio. We have seen latent indications that the courts are coming to recognize
this decoupling, so it is now incumbent to formulate arguments that further the
efforts of the courts to modify the defences to a claim of defamation in a manner
consistent with the law and the interests.being served.
136. See also Grant, supra note 7 at para. 58. The SCC states that "people who enter public life
cannot reasonably expect to be immune from criticism, some of it harsh and undeserved."
137. Gibbons, supra note 108 at 597.
TARANTINO, CHASING REPUTATION 621
IV. A DEFAMATION TORT FOR PUBLIC FIGURES
A. INTRODUCTION
The project that confronts us, then, is to craft a proposal that takes account of the
following imperatives: the need to respect the dignity of the individual and foster
the search for truth, as articulated in Hill and Lucas; the rights of freedom of
expression and freedom of the media, as given prominence in Grant, Cusson, and
WIC Radio; the public interest in the dissemination of accurate information, as
confirmed in Hill, Cusson, Grant, and WIC Radio; the need to reduce any inap-
propriate chilling effect that defamation claims exert over potential defendants,
particularly media outlets; and the recognition of the development of reputation
as celebrity and the impact of the development of mass and interactive media.
As noted by the SCC in WIC Radio, courts in numerous jurisdictions "have
concluded that the traditional elements of th[e] tort [of defamation] may require
modification to provide broader accommodation to the value of freedom of
expression,"' but even that statement is more tentative than the facts warrant.
Common law courts around the world over the last twenty years have enthusi-
astically modified the tort to respond to the criticisms levied against it and to
accord with new social and legal realities. This has been seen in England,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and now Canada.' The SCC's statement
in WIC Radio prompts a further question: if the traditional elements of the tort
require modification, why limit the modifications solely to the scope or nature
of available defences? Why not modify other elements of the tort? If the chilling
effect of defamation law includes media outlets altering their behaviour in order
to avoid the launching of an action in the first place (rather than just being able
to successfully defend against an action),"' then surely the goal should be to
138. Supra note 5 at para. 15.
139. Reynolds, supra note 61; Jameel, supra note 62; Lange, supra note 87; Lange v. Atkinson,
[2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 385 (C.A.); and NationalMedia Ltd. v. Bogoshi, [1998] 4 S. Afr. L.R.
1196 (S.C.A.).
140. See Franklin, "Good Names," supra note 89 at 13-22. Even though media defendants win
"an overwhelming percentage of the cases that are being brought," they are vociferous critics
of the existing tort regime because of (a) the costs involved in defending actions and (b) the
pernicious nature of self-censorship among media defendants and the negative implications it
has on the dissemination of information (at 13). See also Dale M. Cendali, "Of Things to
Come-The Actual Impact of Herbert v. Lando and a Proposed National Correction
Statute" (1985) 22 Harv. J. on Legis. 441. Cendali observes that "[1]ibel attorneys claim
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reduce the incidence of defamation claims and/or the stakes involved when a
claim is launched, so as to lower the number of situations in which a threatened
defamation claim functions to stifle expression.14 1
To achieve this goal, it is necessary to alter the manner in which defamation
claims are brought. Empirical evidence indicates that merely tinkering with
defences is insufficient to reduce claim incidence. A comprehensive study of
media defamation litigation in England in the post-Reynolds environment
found that while the rate of litigation had "slowed considerably," the Reynolds
privilege was not the only or even a primary reason for the decline. 142 The
primary factors appear to have been legislative modifications'1 -including
the introduction of an "offer to make amends" mechanism, 1" which creates a
defence if an offer to publish a correction and apology is extended but not
accepted, and a summary disposal procedure that enables courts to dismiss a
plaintiffs claim if it has no realistic prospect of success 1"--coupled with the
rising costs of bringing suit and a broader change in civil litigation rules to
encourage early settlements.14 1 While the introduction of RCPI and a more
that the operative question when deciding whether to publish is no longer 'Will we win?' but
has now become 'Will he sue?"' (at 467, citing from Martin Garbus, "New challenge to press
freedom" New York Times Magazine (29 January 1984) 49).
141. "[T]he fear of litigation is as great as the fear of the outcome." Cendali, ibid. at 471.
142. Russell L. Weaver et al., "Defamation Law and Free Speech: Reynolds v. Times Newspapers
and the English Media" (2004) 37 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1255 at 1292-95.
143. Ibid. at 1293-94. The authors of the study note that while the Reynolds privilege is a "positive
and worthwhile addition," what is required is a "culture of robust inquiry and publication
that will turn upon the courts'consistent message prompting cultural change" (at 1315-16)
[emphasis added]. There is thus a dialectic that is effected. Cultural change has occurred,
which obliges the courts to modify the law to take account of such change, which in turn
prompts further cultural change-these processes are mutually constitutive, and once the
dynamic has been set in motion, it is difficult to halt its progress. As discussed above, the
changes afoot in Canada, as well as the lurking recognition in the judgments of a new
conception of reputation, are evidence that this dynamic is currently at play in Canadian
defamation law.
144. Defamation Act 1996(U.K.), 1996, c. 31, ss. 2-4.
145. Ibid., ss. 8-10.
146. See Andrew Kenyon, "Defamation: Comparative Law and Practice" (University of
Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 154, 2006), at n. 26, online: <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=922182>. Kenyon provides as examples the Lord Chancellor's Department, Civil
Procedure Rules, Pre-action Protocol for Defamation (which came into effect on 2 October
TARANTINO, CHASING REPUTATION 623
robust fair comment defence may go some way in addressing the issue in Canada,
they will not constitute an entire answer-and if we are to take seriously the
SCC's concern about the threat of self-censorship, 47 then further developments
are warranted. Indeed, RCPI may prove entirely antithetical to the express aims
of the courts and the media, since a focus on the process of reporting and investi-
gation will "inevitably increase the forensic complexity and financial expense of
litigation" due to the "detailed factual analysis and wide-ranging balancing
exercise envisioned" by defences such as RCPI and the Reynolds privilege."'
Efforts to shield the media by means of adjusting standards of proof (such
as the actual malice standard found in Sullivan'") are effectively a "process
standard" that has resulted in "the paradox that the law ... invented to protect
critics of public figures now makes [such critics] subject to a degree of intrusive-
ness in their news gathering and writing process" that many media defendants
find objectionable.'o Focusing on journalistic process avoids the determination
of the truth of the impugned statements in favour of determining whether the
steps taken by the defendant are consistent with ethical precepts, regardless of
whether observance of those precepts results in the publication of an accurate
statement. A move toward investigations of process will inevitably disappoint
those who wish to lessen the impact of the "chilling effect," unless courts are
willing to address the tort in a more fundamental manner. Worse, moving to a
process investigation means that "reputations may not be vindicated and some
version of the truth may not be actually established,""' thus undermining one
2000) and Lord Chancellor's Department, Civil Procedure Rules, Rules & Practice
Directions, Part-3 (which came into effect on 28 February 2000).
147. See WIC Radio, supra note 5 at para. 15.
148. Peter A. Downard, Libel (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2003) at 102. The SCC has noted
this concern but has rejected it:
It is also argued that a defence based on the conduct of the defendant may lead to costly and
lengthy litigation over questions of journalistic practice about which claimants can have no
advance knowledge. ... [T]he objection goes not so much to principle as to the particular
test and procedures adopted. Whatever defence is accepted, it must be workable and fair to
both plaintiff and defendant.
See Grant, supra note 7 at paras. 63-64.
149. Sullivan, supra note 6.
150. Martin M. Shapiro, "Libel Regulatory Analysis" (1986) 74 Cal. L. Rev. 883 at 886. See also
Weaver et al., supra note 142 at 1304-07.
151. Gibbons, supra note 108 at 611.
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of the animating goals of the tort. The defamation tort system itself has been
attacked as being expensive, inefficient, and replete with perverse incentives. 15 2
The aim should therefore be to prevent as many "chilling" claims (i.e., those
brought by high profile plaintiffs with significant funds) from being brought as
possible, while diverting those that are brought into a modified tort that is
faster, less expensive to litigate, and less intrusive on freedom of expression.
There are at least two other compelling reasons for undertaking reforms to the
tort beyond those that have thus far been articulated by the Canadian courts. The
first relates to the motivations of defamation plaintiffs. Available evidence indicates
that plaintiffs launch defamation claims notwithstanding the low prospect of a
favourable verdict.' Making victory more difficult to obtain (by making defences
easier to access) will have little effect since "victory" (in the form of a favourable
judgment for damages) is often not what plaintiffs are seeking-rather, "the major
motivating factors are restoring reputation, correcting what plaintiffs view as falsity,
and vengeance."'' Potential monetary outcomes have little bearing on the decision
to sue, and the commencement of the suit itself is an act of actualization with the
result that "plaintiffs feel they have accomplished something simply by suing-even
if they are later unsuccessful.""' This apparent distortion is even more pronounced
among the archetypal "chilling effect" plaintiffs-namely, "highly visible, public
plaintiffs" who have sufficient monetary assets to wage a campaign of litigation
attrition."' The primary concern of most plaintiffs appears to be the perceived
152. Franklin, "Good Names," supra note 89 at 13.
153. See Randall P. Bezanson, "The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What
Plaintiffs Get" (1986) 74 Cal. L. Rev. 789 [Bezanson, "Libel Suit"]. See also Marc A.
Franklin, "Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation" (1980)
1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 455; Marc A. Franklin, "Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation
Study" (1981) 1981 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 795 at 802-03. In the latter article, Franklin
notes that the majority of actions are evidently resolved in favour of the defendant at the
stage of a motion for dismissal or summary judgment (though it should be noted that of
those cases that reach trial, the majority are decided in favour of the plaintiff).
154. Bezanson, "Libel Suit," ibid. at 791. See also John Soloski, "The Study and the Libel
Plaintiff: Who Sues for Libel?" (1985) 71 Iowa L. Rev. 217 at 220; Randall P. Bezanson,
"Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight" (1985) 71 Iowa L.
Rev. 226 at 228 [Bezanson, "Libel Law"].
155. Bezanson, "Libel Suit," ibid at 791, 793.
156. Ibid at 795, 797. If confronted with a repeated incident of perceived disparagement by a
media outlet, overwhelming numbers of defamation plaintiffs-more than 80 per cent-
would sue again.
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falsity of the impugned statement, with a primary goal of "setting the record
straight."' Damages are rarely the motivating factor-instead, obtaining a public
correction of the record dominates.' Randall P. Bezanson concluded that "most
plaintiffs sue [because] they have no effective alternative for redressing reputational
harm."'" There is a marked disjunction between the objectives of defamation
plaintiffs on the one hand and the objectives set by the legal system and the as-
sumptions inherent therein on the other-the latter focus on the "ascertainment of
fault and imposition of money damages," while the former seek to correct
(perceived) misstatements and thereby vindicate (perceived) reputation."'0 The
current structure of the tort assumes that monetary damages constitute an effective,
and desired, remedy"'-an assumption that does not accord with the views or
desires of plaintiffs. As Bezanson concludes, "the failure of libel law to reflect the
realities that exist in libel litigation accounts in large part" for the unhappiness with
the tort expressed by so many. Moreover, "libel law today no longer reflects a set of
assumptions that may have-been sound in an earlier time."' A preferred solution is
one that addresses the needs of both plaintiffs and defendants.
The second argument in favour of further modification of the tort is
doctrinal. If the reputation as celebrity argument is correct, then celebrity
plaintiffs are not entitled to the full panoply of assumptions and damages
that go with a traditional defamation claim and should not be in a position
to avail themselves of them. The WIC Radio reasoning acknowledges this in
its approving recitation of Macdonell: entering the public arena modifies in
some relevant sense the ability of an individual to resort to the courts."
Given a range of available options, the courts have elected to make modifica-
tions at the end of the process (i.e., defences), rather than at the beginning
(i.e., standirtg and procedure). The Grant decision's move away from truth
and its focus instead on process is precisely the wrong thing to do since it
neither satisfies plaintiffs (they will still want to sue), nor addresses defen-
dants' concerns (they will still need to spend inordinate amounts of money
157. Ibid at 800.
158. Ibid at 801.
159. Ibid. at 807.
160. Ibid at 808.
161. Bezanson, "Libel Law," supra note 154 at 226.
162. Ibid. at 226-27.
163. See WIC Radio, supra note 5 at para. 57, citing Macdonell, supra note 57.
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to defend actions, resulting in a chilling effect)-and it is inconsistent with
the emphasis in Hill on the importance of truth.'6 There is thus the need to
effect changes that comport with both imperatives: making defamation law
more compliant with freedom of expression and ensuring that mechanisms for
truth-seeking are enhanced.
B. PROPOSAL
Sustained criticism of the tort of defamation has given rise to a plethora of
proposed alternative mechanisms for addressing reputational harm.' The
impetus for the changes that are present in current Canadian defamation juris-
prudence and academic commentary, guided by the incremental approach
required by Dolphin Delivery, lead to the following proposal,'" which contem-
plates the bifurcation of the tort of defamation into two separate (though
related and similar) causes of action: one for public figure plaintiffs and one for
private person plaintiffs. This proposal envisages that, but for the differences
described below, the tort would remain largely the same as currently mani-
fested-the critical and distinctive element being the presence or absence of a
public figure. Where a public figure is present in the matrix of facts giving rise
to a claim of defamation, then a modification is called for in how the common
law treats that individual as a plaintiff. This proposal seeks to retain the broad
contours of the existing tort, with the following modifications:
* Public figure plaintiffs should be entitled to bring-indeed should,
subject to the remainder of this proposal, be limited to bringing-an
action that seeks to "correct the record";
164. See also Adrienne Stone, "Defamation of Public Figures: North American Contrasts" (2005-
2006) 50 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 9 at 22-23.
165. See e.g. James H. Hulme, "Vindicating Reputation: An Alternative to Damages as a Remedy
for Defamation" (1981) 30 Am. U. L. Rev. 375; Franklin, "Good Names," supra note 89;
Cendali, supra note 140; Marc A. Franklin, "A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current
Libel Law" (1986) 74 Cal. L. Rev. 809 (Franklin, "Declaratory Judgment"]; Rodney A. Smolla
& Michael J. Gaertner, "The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal: The Case for Enactment"
(1989-1990) 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 25; and John L. Diamond, "Rethinking Media
Liability for Defamation of Public Figures" (1995-1996) 5 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 289.
166. This proposal is an amalgam of elements from the concrete proposals advanced by Cendali,
ibid.; Hulme, ibid.; Franklin, "Good Names," ibid.; Franklin, "Declaratory Judgment," ibid;
and Smolla & Gaertner, ibid. See also Gibbons, supra note 108. Gibbons provides a general
theoretical outline that roughly accords with the proposal.
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* Public figure plaintiffs should be restricted in recovering damages
from defendants, except for special damages that the plaintiff can
prove and punitive damages in egregious situations (such as publica-
tion with malice);
* Public figure plaintiffs should bear the burden of proving the falsity
of the impugned statement;
* Subject to having made a timely request for a correction, and having
demonstrated falsity, a public figure plaintiff should be entitled
to a court declaration as to the falsity of the impugned statement
and an order that the defendant publish a prompt and relevant
correction. Such correction would contain a positive substantive
statement incorporating an acknowledgement that the defendant
published incorrect and defamatory statements about the plaintiff
and would also set out the truth relative to the impugned statement.
Failure by the defendant to comply would result in the plaintiff
being entitled to receive general and punitive damages; and
* Pre-trial discovery for the modified tort should be limited to the
issues of standing, falsity, and, if the plaintiff so pleads, special
damages.167
One primary goal of the modified action would be to reduce the multiplicity
of issues being determined at trial; ideally, the only contentious issue would be
the truth or falsity of the impugned statement.16 1 While absolute privileges and
fair comment would remain, as those defences aim to preserve certain public
interests that otherwise outwligh the plaintiffs reputational interest, RCPI and
qualified privileges would not be available. Because the modified action would
drastically reduce liability and focus on determining the truth of the impugned
statement, those defences would no longer be required.
Of the elements of the bifurcated tort listed above, the items listed below
warrant extended discussion.
167. Where a public figure plaintiff attempts to bring a standard defamation claim, the defendant
could seek dismissal or summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff should be bringing
a modified action.
168. This assumes that the plaintiff can prove relatively easily that the defendant published a
factual defamatory statement and that the statement referred to the plaintiff.
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1. PUBLIC FIGURE PLAINTIFFS
The concept of the public figure has gained little purchase in Canadian defa-
mation law, certainly not as a formal category of analysis. In the United
States, by contrast, the distinction between public figures and private figures
exists in multiple torts (such as breach of privacy and defamation). This critical
analytical distinction gives rise to the requirement that a public figure defamation
plaintiff, in addition to proving that the statement was false, must prove a
defendant's actual malice (i.e., knowledge of falsity or conscious disregard as
to the truth) in order to win a defamation claim.' The concept itself is fluid
and nuanced, providing a purposive device that can be used to ascertain when
the "second order" of defamation claim proposed herein is to be used. A cluster
of metrics can be used to determine whether a particular plaintiff qualifies as
a public figure. Under US case law, an individual qualifies as a public figure
when public attention is focused on him by virtue of "accomplishments,
fame, or mode-of living, or [adoption of] a profession or calling" that provides
the public with "a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his charac-
ter."' 70 US courts also look to whether the persons in question have "thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence
the resolution of the issues involved."' 7 1
The corollary of adopting a public figure distinction is the creation of a
"private person" category. US defamation law allows private persons to prove
and recover actual damages using a negligence standard (rather than the more
stringent actual malice standard)'72 on the basis that private persons are more
vulnerable to injury than public figures and their reputations are more deserving
of protection."'7  That recognition is consistent with the argument advanced
herein, namely that there is something qualitatively different' about individuals
who possess reputation as celebrity: their discursive power to yoke the media to
their reputation-constructing ends.'4 Discursive power is the ability not just to
169. See generally Catherine Hancock, "Origins of the Public Figure Doctrine in First
Amendment Defamation Law" (2005-2006) 50 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 81.
170. Ibid at 88-89, citing William L. Prosser, "Privacy" (1960) 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 at 410.
171. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 at 345 (1974).
172. Ibid. at 349-50.
173. Ibid. at 345-46.
174. Rolph, supra note 92 at 175.
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erect a website putting his or her version of the story online (which virtually
anyone can now do), but also the ability to cause mass media outlets to devote
attention to his or her side of the story.
While Canadian courts have repeatedly expressed reluctance to embrace
Sullivan-style changes regarding actual malice,"s three matters must be
stressed: first, this proposal is markedly different from Sullivan and does not
conflict with the reasons for which the SCC disparaged Sullivan; second, the
public figure concept itself predates the Sullivan decision as a defence applicable
in infringement of privacy cases and so can be relied on without being
dragged into the vortex of debate over the advisability of Sullivan and its
progeny; and third, Canadian defamation law already recognizes that certain
plaintiffs require different treatment vis-1-vis the remedies available to
them,"' which can be construed as a latent foundation for acceptance of the
public figure concept. The public figure concept was entrenched in US defa-
mation law in the. concurring reasons in the Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts17 7
decision, which expanded the reach of the Sullivan actual malice requirement
beyond public officials. The rationales for the extension of the actual malice
rule to public figures are congruent with those enunciated in the Cusson,
Grant, and WIC Radio decisions: "the public need for uninhibited debate
about the activities and opinions of those with informal political and social
power.""' Both concurring opinions in Butts expressly note the ability of the
public figure to access and use communications media as a counter to criticism
and as a positive self-help remedy in the form of a "tool for rebutting libels.""'
This is also congruent with the argument advanced in this article that the
differential ability to access reputation as a celebrity warrants differential
treatment with respect to access to the defamation tort and its remedies.
The public figure concept admits of a variety of sub-categories (such as
those who strive for notoriety regardless of talent or profession) and exceptions
(such as private individuals who unwillingly or unintentionally become the
subject of public scrutiny). The question of whether a plaintiff is a public figure
175. See e.g. Grant, supra note 7 at paras. 44-46; Hill, supra note 2 at para. 127ff.
176. See WIC Radio, supra note 5 at para. 57. See also the discussion of Justice LeBel's concurring
judgment in WIC Radio in Part 11(A), above.
177. 388 U.S. 133 (1967) [Butts].
178. Hancock, supra note 169 at 131.
179. Ibid. at 131-32. See also Butts, supra note 177 at paras. 155, 164.
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should be heavily weighted toward a determination of whether the plaintiff has
access to the media and, therefore, possesses discursive power. Greater recognition
of the fact that Canadian courts have been willing to treat different plaintiffs
differently (even if such treatment has been non-systematic because it is often
unarticulated) would parallel developments in other areas of law, such as privacy
law, where the "celebrity" status of a plaintiff is a factor to be taken into account
when assessing whether there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy. 80
The public figure concept is also broader than the term "celebrity" implies-
celebrity denotes an individual engaged in (or at least peripheral to) one of the
entertainment industries (film, television, publishing, music, et cetera). To be
meaningful, however, "public figure" must be broad enough to include not
just celebrities, but also public officials and individuals who possess either
policy-level public power or private power that is exercised in the public sphere.
It needs to be broad enough to encompass such persons as public intellectuals,
prominent business people, and NGO leaders, subject always to their capacity
to wield discursive power.
2. DAMAGES LIMITED TO PROVABLE ACTUAL DAMAGES AND PUNITIVE
. DAMAGES
One critical element of the revised tort envisioned herein is the removal of the
presumption of harm to reputation warranting general damages. A fundamental
criticism of the current tort is that it incentivizes, and even rewards, plaintiffs
where they have suffered no pecuniary loss and that the prospect of large (and
unpredictable) damage awards results in self-censorship on the part of the media.
The presumption that general damages must be awarded can be justified in the
case of private figures. Given the importance of reputation to the private individual
(as articulated in Hil), defendants (and, given their discursive power to damage
reputations, media defendants in particular) are properly put on guard by having
the potential for a defamation claim guide their actions. The current tort claim,
imperfect though it may be, functions as the best method for vindicating the
reputation of the private individual and guarding against malicious or unscrupulous
media activities, as recognized in Hill. Private plaintiffs appear to be much more
likely than public plaintiffs "to experience significant economic harm" from
defamatory statements, but are less likely to have the financial resources to fight
180. See Campbell v. M.G.N Ltd., [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L. (Eng.)).
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for recompense, particularly against a media defendant; 8 1 such plaintiffs should,
therefore, remain entitled to the standard compensatory damages presumption.
Such concerns, however, play less of a role when dealing with public figures.
Indeed, given the resources of public figures and the importance of free discussion
about them and their activities, it is proper to remove the cudgel that the
standard tort claim represents and remove the excessive disincentive from the
media in reporting on public figures in a vigorous manner.
It is also important to retain the ability to access damages if they can be
proven-if the plaintiff has suffered pecuniary loss, the argument against
recovery for such loss is removed.'. Also to be avoided is a situation where
the only relief is a correction-there are individuals who do genuinely suffer
economic harm or situations where punitive damages are appropriate given
the malicious conduct of the defendant.'" To ensure that defendants do not
simply view the declaration/publication alternative as an acceptable price to
pay for intentional libels and that wealthy plaintiffs do not simply launch
actions to silence critics, the successful party should be entitled to a full in-
demnity from the losing party on legal fees. This will also incentivize defen-
dants to keep the process moving as quickly as possible and to settle in some
cases. Finally, the retention of punitive damages for public figures is likely a
requirement under the authorities set forth in both Dolphin Delivery and Hill.
Entirely stripping plaintiffs of any possibility of damages may be too radical a
change to comport with the incremental requirements of Charter-driven
common law change, and, given the imbalance in resources between plaintiffs
and media outlets, the (rarely-invoked) spectre of punitive damages will continue
to act as a check on unscrupulous outlets.
3. DECLARATION OF FALSITY
All Canadian superior courts have an inherent power to issue declaratory
judgments.'" The burden should be on the public figure plaintiff to plead and
181. Skolnick, supra note 113 at 684.
182. For suggestions about how such loss could be proven, see Barendt, supra note 95 at 123-24.
Barendt suggests a variety of ways that loss could be proven, including evidence that existing
relationships have been damaged or that anticipated remunerative opportunities have been
lost (e.g., demonstrating that chances for promotion have been damaged or that prospective
performance opportunities have been withheld).
183. Hill, supra note 2 at paras. 196-99.
184. See e.g. Courts offusticeAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43, s. 97.
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demonstrate that the impugned statement was false. This addresses one of the
most damaging criticisms of the traditional tort: Requiring 5 defendant to
prove the truth of a statement, subject to the full burden of rules of evidence
and the exigencies of journalistic practice (such as the need to rely on anony-
mous or confidential sources), leaves the defendant vulnerable to predatory
defamation plaintiffs. Reversing the burden is justified by the nature of the
plaintiff in question. That the burden currently falls on defendants is meant to
incentivize defendants to exercise due care in their reporting and publication
vis---vis the fragile reputation of the individual.' But public figure plaintiffs
not only have more robust reputations than the average individual, they also
have the ability to reconstruct their reputations when damaged.
The court's decision would include a simple declaration that the impugned
statement was incorrect and a concise statement of the truth of the matter. To
prove falsity, a plaintiff would need to demonstrate (on a balance of probabili-
ties) that there exists lack of sufficient evidence to support the statement or that
sufficient evidence that rebuts the statement exists. Such a standard meets the
dual needs of establishing veracity while not being overly burdensome on media
reporting resources (as RCPI may be).
4. ORDER TO PUBLISH CORRECTION
In order to properly protect the reputational interest of the plaintiff (and, it
should be stressed again, even public figures have a protectible reputational
interest), the declaration of falsity must be coupled with an order to disseminate
the correction. It is difficult to improve on the following statement:
"[E]xculpation in the eyes of the world is not accomplished by quiet entry of a
judgment on the musty rolls of a court." The court-ordered publication
would (1) contain a definitive statement that the earlier publication was incorrect
and an indication of what the truth actually is and (2) need to be published in a
manner consonant with the original publication-in short, in a similarly con-
spicuous timeslot or page location, using similar font sizes (for print media),
185. Hill, supra note 2 at para. 137.
186. Hulme, supra note 165 at 392, n. 90, citing Clarence Morris, "Inadvertent Newspaper Libel
and Retraction" (1937-1938) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 36 at 38.
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emphasis, and devotion of timespan (for broadcast media), with the goal of
achieving dissemination at least as wide as the original publication.'"
It should be stressed that this relief is distinct from a plaintiffs "right of
reply," whereby an outlet is obliged to accord airtime or column inches to the
publication of a statement or column penned by the plaintiff.'" There are a
number of reasons for preferring a statement of correction to a right of reply. A
reply fails to address the public interest in "setting the record straight" and is
also less desirable for plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their reputations, as a reply
does not bear the authoritative imprimatur of the court. In the context of the
public figure in particular, it is also unclear what the right of reply would really
add to the situation, since the public figure already has the means at his or her
disposal to disseminate (his or her version of) the truth. Also troubling is the
intrusiveness of the right to reply-the courts would be functionally forcing
media outlets to abdicate editorial control for a given period of time or amount
of space in favour of an adverse party.'" It is for the latter reason that the US
SC declared "right of reply" statutes to be unconstitutional;'90 although that
decision was made in the different constitutional landscape of the United
States, there is reason to think that a similar result would occur in Canada.
There is an important difference between forcing an outlet to provide space
for a reply and forcing an outlet to devote space to a correction, however. Criti-
cally, in a right of reply, there is no authoritative declaration as to the truth of
the matter-rather, the right of reply functions only to further the conversation,
as it were."' However, where a court declaration regarding the matter has been
187. Dissemination would need to be at least as wide as for the original publication because there
are conceivable situations in which a non-prominent original publication was amplified by
subsequent outlets.
188. The "right of reply" is sometimes manifested in state-level statutes in the United States, the
constitutionality of which is debatable following the decision in Miarni Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) [Tornillo]. This "right of reply" must be distinguished from
that contained in many media ethics codes. The latter obliges a reporter to attempt to obtain
comment from the subject of a potentially damaging report, while the former is a statutory
remedy that obliges a media outlet (historically print outlets) to print a "reply" to a
defamatory publication.
189. See Cendali, supra note 140 at 476-77.
190. Tornillo, supra note 188.
191. Cendali, supra note 140 at 477. Cendali notes that "stimulating the exchange of ideas" was
not a sufficient basis for the US SC to warrant interference with editorial independence and
free speech (at n. 272, citing Tornillo, ibid. at 258).
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made, an even more fundamental Canadian constitutional value, one that
underlies the right to free expression itself, has been engaged, i.e., the quest for
truth.192 After the court has made a declaration as to the truth, asking a media
outlet to turn over editorial control, not to an opposing party but to the court,
is a very different matter. Indeed, it would be curious for a media outlet to
argue that it was reluctant to publish a court-determined version of the truth.'
V. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS
Before closing, I wish to address some foreseeable criticisms of the foregoing
proposal.
A. THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH
An initial objection to the proposal may be that it is inappropriate for courts to
be in the business of determining truth with respect to contested factual or
historical statements."' But while it is true that the law has not historically
concerned itself with the accuracy of statements solely for the sake of promoting
accuracy," the law should be prepared to do so where such accuracy is incidental
to the protection of reputation and to the furthering of the values underlying
freedom of expression. This is hardly a novel undertaking for courts. They have
historically been called upon to decide truth where it has been raised as a defence
to a libel claim. That court-determined truths are not absolute seems a peculiar
argument to levy-if fully accepted, it radically undermines all areas of juridical
endeavour, not merely defamation law. While recognizing that our efforts may
be imperfect, we should strive to implement mechanisms that at least increase
the possibility of properly identifying the truth. A distinction should also be
drawn between courts as appropriate arbiters of competing opinions and courts
as proper evaluators of factual misstatement-the former is a role for which
courts are not suited, but that is already addressed by the fair comment defence.
192. Hill, supra note 2 at para. 104.
193. Many codified standards of journalism ethics make it incumbent on media outlets to
promptly correct errors. See Cendali, supra note 140 at 491, n. 360.
194. See Diamond, supra note 165.
195. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., "Possible New Remedies for Errors in the Press" (1946) 60 Harv. L.
Rev. I at 2.
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Courts are properly charged with.assessing the accuracy of (purportedly) factual
statements and facts that an audience would presume to be true as foundational
for an expressed opinion.
B. VAGARIES OF A "PUBLIC FIGURE" TEST
The introduction of a public figure test suggests at least two criticisms. First, the
test itself may be too vague for successful application. Second, assuming the test is
workable, the technological changes that underpin the proposal herein do not
argue in favour of dropping altogether the distinction between "public" and
"private" figures. The first criticism casts itself too strongly: tort law in particular
is replete with tests that require delineation by the courts. US courts, under the
rubrics of a number of torts, have attempted over decades to give content to the
term "public figure." Notably, despite a veritable flood of criticisms of the post-
Sullivan tort of defamation by US commentators, the public figure test itself
attracts relatively little opprobrium. Arguing that the concept of public figure is
too arbitrary or vague overlooks that there will inevitably be a locus in the defa-
mation analysis for effecting a reconciliation of the competing expression and
reputation interests. The public figure concept is an appropriate device for courts
to use in expressly engaging in this reconciliation. It is also preferable to deferring
the question to later stages of the defamation action (such as in analyzing the
RCPI or fair comment defences) because undertaking the reconciliation process
at the beginning of the action (i.e., at a request for dismissal or summary judgment
brought by the defendant arguing that the plaintiff is a public figure and thus not
entitled to pursue a standard defamation claim) would result in fewer cases
reaching trial and would avoid costly and invasive pre-trial discoveries."'
The second criticism queries the validity of the distinction between public
and private figures. However, as discussed in Part IV(B)(1), above, inherent in
the concept of reputation as celebrity is the very notion that there is something
relevantly special about public figures. The development of mass and interactive
media has not rendered a previously vertical stratum of public and private figures
196. See Hancock, supra note 169 at 143. Hancock notes that the concept of the public figure
"seems destined to vacillate in its meaning, as a permanent moving target, as long as it retains
the role of expressing hotly contested compromises over the clash of free speech interests and
the ancient interest in reputation protected by libel law."
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into a horizontal landscape where all are equal participants (or generators of
content and recipients of attention) in the stream of information. This article has
advanced the argument that the reputations of some individuals are different in
kind from the reputations of others-it is an argument in favour of a nuanced
approach to addressing reputation by means of tort law, rather than an argument
for a one-size-fits-all solution.
C. SULLIVAN
Another concern about this proposed public figure distinction is that it resembles
the Sullivan approach rather too closely, which would represent a change in Cana-
dian defamation law precluded by the express rejection in Hill (subsequently reaf-
firmed in WIC Radio and Grant) of adopting a Sullivan-style approach.' Though
there is a superficial similarity between Sullivan and this proposal (in that there
would be a shifting of the burden of proof to the plaintiff and that fault, falsity,
and damages would no longer be presumed and subject to rebuttal by the defen-
dant), this proposal accords with the reasons given by the SCC in rejecting the
adoption of Sullivan... and, further, actually addresses the concerns raised by it. The
fundamental criticism of Sullivan set out in Hill is that the actual malice inquiry
shifts the focus of the tort away from determining the truth of the impugned state-
ment and toward an inquiry into the conduct of the defendant, which deprives
plaintiffs of an opportunity to establish falsity and increases the costs of litigation
by involving parties in extensive (and meddlesome) discoveries about the news
reporting process.' The most damaging aspect of Sullivan, in the eyes of the SCC,
is that potentially false statements of fact are left unrebutted, exacting "a major
social cost by deprecating truth in public discourse."200 The proposal advanced in
this article strives to work in precisely the opposite direction of Sullivan, while
retaining the SCC's avowed goal of expanding the ambit of freedom of the
media-toward, rather than away from, determinations of truth and falsity; and
away from, rather than toward, complexity and increasing cost in litigation. In this
regard, if anything, this proposal demonstrates greater fidelity to the aims of the
SCC than the modifications contained in Grant, Cusson, and WIC Radio.
197. Hill, supra note 2 at para. 127ff.
198. Ibid.
199. Ibid. at paras. 127-33.
200. Ibid. at para. 131.
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Finally, it might be generally argued that this proposal fractures defamation law
too greatly-rather than simplifying the tort, this proposal results in needless
complication. But defamation law is already fraught with cleavages, some under-
standable and some nonsensical. Additional complications arising from this
proposal will at least be doctrinally consistent with the interests that animate the
tort. There is also an emerging tendency to treat certain categories of plaintiffs and
defendants differently. For example, US law recognizes a "sectional standards"
approach, whereby a plaintiff who belongs to even a small subset of the commu-
nity holding to irregular moral standards can recover if the plaintiffs reputation is
damaged within that community,20 and English courts have expressed at least an
openness to such an approach.202 As Lawrence McNamara argues, courts should
be prepared to recognize "diverse moral taxonomies,""20 with attendant implications
for what will constitute a defamatory statement. Courts should likewise be prepared
to recognize diverse plaintiffs, with attendant implications for what will constitute
appropriate remedies. Simplification is an admirable goal, but not if it comes at
the expense of the fundamental interests that the tort is designed to serve.
VI. CONCLUSION
Something has changed in the manner in which Canadian appellate courts
engage defamation law. When comparing the seminal SCC defamation de-
cisions of the 1990s to those of the 2000s, it is difficult to avoid concluding
that the affinity once held for the paramount importance of protecting reputation
has been eroded or, at the very least, has evolved to become markedly more
nuanced. Freedom of expression is hailed as the countervailing interest that
must be accorded increased weight when assessing the common law of defamation.
But to merely cite the importance of freedom of expression is insufficient: Why
nearly three decades after its introduction has the Charter suddenly become a
vehicle for remarkable changes in Canadian defamation law?
This article identifies two phenomena that are mutually catalytic and that
prompt the changes evidenced by the recent court decisions in WIC Radio, Cusson,
and Grant a fundamental alteration in the nature of mass and interactive media
201. McNamara, supra note 91 at 120-21.
202. Arab News Network v. Khazen, [2001] EWCA Civ 118 at para. 30.
203. Supra note 91 at 138.
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and an attendant modification of the nature of reputation. Increased.attention to
the theorizing of reputation, the interest whose protection animates the entire tort
of defamation, is rewarded by an appreciation of the fact that reputation is itself a
highly constructed, contextual, and malleable artifact. In a society where mass and
interactive media can be used to both articulat'e and damage reputation-but also
to modify, ameliorate, and mitigate such damage-the manner in which the law
needs to be wielded in order to protect that interest must itself necessarily be
altered. This article posits that much of the criticism surrounding the tort of
defamation is informed by a simple disconnect. Some plaintiffs do not need the
tort of defamation to protect a reified reputation that is either not demonstrably
damaged by defamatory statements or that is (comparatively) easily rectified by
their own power. The complaint is that such plaintiffs in some meaningful sense
misuse the tort in order to achieve other goals (such as the quieting of criticism). If
that is correct, then the answer is not to tweak technical elements of the existing
tort in order to achieve a proper calibration of the interests of reputation and free
speech. Instead, the answer is to recast the tort into two different tracks, one for
public figure plaintiffs, who pose the highest risk of abusing the tort, and one for
private plaintiffs, whose reputational interest is more akin to the traditional notion
of reputation that the existing tort seeks to protect.
The proposal described herein is guided by the need to take account of chang-
ing technology, while observing fidelity to the SCC's reconciliation approach to
defamation law; rather than introducing new tools to effect a balance, it seeks to
curtail the extent of reputation-based protection to which certain plaintiffs are
entitled. We have not seen the concepts discussed herein expressly addressed by
Canadian courts on the terms used in this article because, due to a lack of prior
articulation, Canadian courts are so unused to discussing reputation that they have
not developed the syntax for it. Instead, they have been reduced to parsing an
idiomatic discussion that revolves around "competing" interests of reputation and
expression. It would be better to grapple with reputation as it actually exists in
modern society and to reform doctrine in light of that reality, instead of tinkering
with marginal facets of doctrine while labouring under received misperceptions.
